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Towards decolonising constitutionalism: 
An introduction  
Georgia Lockie
THE YEAR 2016 saw the publication of two important, but fundamentally divergent, works on Aotearoa New Zea-land’s constitutional arrangements. Sir Geoffrey Palmer 
and Andrew Butler’s A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand 
argues for, and drafts, a supreme, written constitution based 
substantially on Aotearoa New Zealand’s existing constitution-
al orthodoxy, but offering what the authors see as important 
additional safeguards in the interests of, for example, democra-
cy, accountability, and human rights.1 This envisaged constitu-
tion includes protection of the Treaty of Waitangi’s current con-
1 Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2016), 7, 25-27. Note that Palmer and But-
ler have recently released a follow-up text, Towards Democratic Renewal: Ideas 
for Constitutional Change in New Zealand (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
2018). This article was written before that book’s release and therefore does not 
engage with it.
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stitutional place through entrenchment, essentially extending 
the logic of developments in the legal recognition of the Treaty 
since the 1980s.2
In contrast is He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō 
Aotearoa, the 2016 report of Matike Mai Aotearoa, the Independ-
ent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation. Matike 
Mai, chaired by Professor Margaret Mutu and convened by 
Moana Jackson, formed in 2010 at a meeting of the Iwi Chairs’ 
Forum. It was given broad, but specific, terms of reference, being 
asked to explore a different kind of constitutionalism based upon 
He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Niu Tireni of 1835 and 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi of 1840.3 While Palmer and Butler’s vision 
is one of reforming and strengthening our current Westminster 
constitutional system, Matike Mai’s is one of transformational, 
creative change, in which there is room for tino rangatiratanga—
substantive self-determination—to be realised.
The Matike Mai report acknowledges the difficulty of 
such an endeavour; our current constitutional arrangements seem 
‘immoveable and unchallengeable’, inevitable because they are all we 
know.4 However, they are historically contingent, and the perception 
of their immutability is itself a consequence of colonisation, whereby 
British law and its supporting ideologies were forcibly transposed to 
Aotearoa, overpowering existing ways of life, law, and constitutional 
arrangements, which te Tiriti purported to protect.5 As the report 
notes, since 1840, tangata whenua have sought ‘a respectful and 
equal constitutional relationship with the Crown as promised in Te 
2 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 62, 146-159.
3 Matike Mai Aotearoa–The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Trans-
formation, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 2016, 12-14.
4 Ibid., 15.
5 See Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the 
Treaty: The Report on Stage 1 of the Te Paparahi o Te Raki Inquiry (Wai 1040), 2014. 
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Tiriti’ and ‘have never abandoned the treaty promise’.6 
Here, after situating this work theoretically, I explore 
and contextualise these two texts as they represent, respectively, 
a modern ideal-typical Pākehā position on constitutionalism in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, and a critical, Māori constitutional dis-
course from which this orthodoxy can be interrogated. Through 
this comparison, I argue that Pākehā constitutional orthodoxy 
continues to talk past Māori constitutional aspirations because 
it fails to account for its own ideological and ontological biases, 
representing itself as occupying a space of reality and neutrality, 
rather than domination. Because this orthodoxy perceives tino-
rangatiratanga claims through this lens of self-affirming bias, it 
perpetually misapprehends and mischaracterises these claims—
as either seeking mere property and management rights (these 
being already constitutionally provided for), or, if something 
more substantial, as unrealistic, divisive, and extreme. 
This miscommunication makes it immensely difficult to 
have a productive conversation about constitutional justice. My 
aim here is not to offer solutions about how we can radicalise and 
decolonise our constitution, but rather to introduce this consti-
tutional debate as an initial step beyond this miscommunication 
and towards constitutional decolonisation. Exploring these two 
constitutional positions demonstrates how the issue of consti-
tutionalism goes further than itself: it is not simply about the 
structure of government, but delves much deeper into the philo-
sophical and ontological contestation at work in ‘post’- colonial 
settler states.
I take for granted that there is room for constitutional 
improvement in Aotearoa New Zealand; this is the motivation 
for both of these texts, and for my consideration of them. More 
broadly, factors such as economic globalisation, increasing wealth 
6 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 12.
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inequality, shifted and shifting geopolitical relations, increasing 
multiculturalism, climate change, and technological advance-
ments all create a social and political situation in which it is pru-
dent to reconsider how we think about sovereignty and constitu-
tionalism; our world is now vastly different from that in which 
our constitutional orthodoxy was conceived. I therefore conclude 
with a discussion of the potential for law to be a deeply crea-
tive institution, arguing that we ought to harness this creativity 
moving forward constitutionally. However, constitutionalism in 
Aotearoa New Zealand cannot progress fruitfully or satisfacto-
rily while the two conversations discussed here—represented 
by Palmer and Butler on the one hand and Matike Mai on the 
other—happen independently of one another. Given historic and 
contemporary colonial-power imbalances, the onus is on solipsis-
tic orthodox Pākehā constitutionalism to finally take seriously 
Māori constitutional aspirations; better nearly 180 years late 
than never.
Rethinking democracy through postcoloniality
In this work I take up an aspirational praxis of postcoloniality, 
‘a critical engagement with the aftermath of colonisation . . . 
that critiques, and in a political sense, seeks to undermine the 
structures, ideologies, and institutions that gave colonisation 
meaning’.7 Postcolonialism is not the same as, but is part of the 
process of, decolonisation.8 Because of the ‘ambivalence, contra-
diction, and hybrid nature of colonisation,’ a postcolonial prax-
is requires self-awareness and reflexivity, particularly by those 
7 Giselle Byrnes, ‘Past the Last Post? Time, Causation, and Treaty Claims History,’ 
Law Text Culture 7 (2003): 253.
8 Ibid., 254.
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who materially benefit from colonialism’s ongoing effects and are 
therefore always potentially complicit;9 the postcolonial goals of 
this research are therefore aspirational and tentative. 
As part of this praxis, I consciously take up the identity 
of Pākehā, not just culturally, but politically. Avril Bell explains 
the dual signification, and therefore ambiguity, of ‘Pākehā’ as 
an identity: it refers not only to nationality and ethnicity, an 
Aotearoa New Zealand-specific whiteness, but also acknowledg-
es a constitutive relationship to Māori, based on the history of 
the terms ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’.10 ‘Pākehā’ specifically denotes 
otherness in relation to Māori; self-consciously adopting it as an 
identity recognises the colonial relationship and carries antico-
lonial commitments. While white New Zealanders often centre 
themselves as ‘normal New Zealanders’, ‘Pākehā identity rec-
ognises and names white New Zealanders as one group among 
many. . . . Discursively this goes some way towards undermin-
ing white hegemony’.11
Postcolonial reflexivity in Aotearoa New Zealand 
requires both constant vigilance to the tendency of Pākehā voic-
es, and Pākehā knowledge and ways of knowing, to structure 
reality, and active engagement with the work of Māori thinkers 
and mātauranga Māori more broadly. This is an always-unfin-
ished back-and-forth process of epistemic de- and re-construc-
tion. It requires epistemic humility: identifying complicity and 
bias within myself that has been learned through a Pākehā life 
taking place within Pākehā epistemic hegemony, an ongoing 
exercise of peeling back layers of learned racism, de-centring my 
9 Ibid.
10 Avril Bell, ‘“We’re Just New Zealanders”: Pakeha Identity Politics,’ in Nga Patai: 
Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, ed. Paul Spoonley, Cluny 
Macpherson, and David Pearson (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1996), 153-
154; see also Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou: Struggle Without End 
(Auckland: Penguin, 2004), 94, for a discussion of this linguistic history.
11 Bell, ‘“We’re Just New Zealanders”,’ 153.
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own perspective and experience and those of other Pākehā. It 
has required seeking out Māori scholarship at university (and 
beyond), because it is so under-represented in subjects outside 
of Māori Studies.12 It means reading, or rather reading through, 
Pākehā texts to identify their bias and interrogate their claims 
to authority. Essentially, it requires genuine listening and com-
mitment to change.
Some outspoken Pākehā are vehemently opposed to 
institutional mechanisms for increased Māori political power, 
which are perceived as democratically questionable because 
Māori are a quantitative minority in Aotearoa New Zealand.13 
This is and will continue to be a serious barrier to the kind of 
constitutional transformation envisaged by Matike Mai. What is 
needed, therefore, is an interrogation of the very idea of democ-
racy to unsettle the primacy and apparent immutability of our 
current system, and therefore recognise an element of universal-
ity in the tino-rangatiratanga struggle. As such, one of my aims 
here is to denaturalise current orthodoxy and its claims to demo-
cratic legitimacy. This creates room for a conversation that is 
more substantively democratic than the ‘quantitative’ democracy 
we currently have.
Moana Jackson notes that, while many of the tangible, 
material effects of colonisation—land confiscations, land wars 
violence, the Parihaka invasion—have slowly been acknowl-
12 I would like to acknowledge Dr Carwyn Jones, whose course on Māori Customary 
Law at Victoria University of Wellington’s law school was a shining light of criti-
cal and creative learning amidst the drudgery of a degree that ordinarily takes 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s colonial legal system for granted. This course provided 
the initial tools for thinking through the issues discussed in this article.
13 The most inflammatory of these oppositions can be witnessed in a range of plat-
forms, such as comments sections on online news articles about these issues, cam-
paigns such as those by lobby group Hobson’s Pledge, and, perhaps most disap-
pointingly, legal scholarship. The views expressed in D J. Round ‘Two Futures: A 
Reverie on Constitutional Review’ (Otago Law Review 12, no. 3 (2011): 525-556) 
are precisely the kinds of arguments I seek to undermine here.
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edged as wrongs by many Pākehā, and the New Zealand state 
in formal apologies, the intangible and subtle effects have 
not.14 While explicit colonial violence is rightfully perceived as 
shameful, the dismissal and suppression of Māori spirituality, 
ontology, and philosophy, as well as Māori political and legal 
theory, is barely perceived.15 However, the tangible and intangi-
ble effects of colonisation in this land arise from the same logic: an 
overarching philosophy underpinning the colonial project, some-
thing ‘born of a Christian God, a capitalist ethic, a common law, 
an imperial domain, and an individuated manifest destiny’, all 
philosophical tenets at odds with Māori ways of being and doing 
at the time.16 This philosophy became hegemonic with the con-
solidation and entrenchment of the New Zealand colonial legal 
order and, despite apparent progress in the last few decades, this 
colonial philosophy persists, ‘now more often covert rather than 
overt, more often cloaked in the newspeak of bicultural rhetoric 
or legal pluralism rather than the open bluster of colonisation’.17
Pratap Bhanu Mehta explains the breadth and depth of 
imperialism:18
An imperial order epitomises a constitution of being—reaching 
through all the realms of being from the material to the transcen-
dental. Imperial orders can structure political possibilities, fix the 
terms of economic exchange, produce hierarchies of knowledge, and 
redraw the boundaries between the sacred and the profane . . .  they 
14 Moana Jackson, ‘The Treaty and the Word: The Colonization of Māori Philoso-
phy,’ in Justice, Ethics & New Zealand Society, ed. Graham Oddie and Roy Perrett 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1.
15 Ibid., 1.
16 Ibid., 1-2.
17 Ibid.
18 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘After Colonialism: The Impossibility of Self-Determina-
tion,’ in Colonialism and its Legacies, ed. Jacob T. Levy and Iris Marion Young 
(Plymouth UK: Lexington Books, 2011), 147-148 (emphasis mine).
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reorder a sense of time and history and produce new forms of sub-
jectivity . . .  An empire was more than simply a dominion over ter-
ritory and people; it was an exercise (literally) in creating a world 
and controlling its meaning.
While I am concerned specifically here with law and constitu-
tionalism, what is at stake is much broader. As Mehta notes, ‘It 
is important to see Empire as creating a new existential order 
to be able to see what anti-imperial politics might be about’.19 
Decolonising the constitution is not just about greater political 
power for tangata whenua for its own sake. Constitutional power 
is necessary to frame a legal system enabling of a tangata-when-
ua ontological and existential perspective and way of life, which 
are currently materially impinged on by a colonial legal system 
based upon an altogether different set of ontological and philo-
sophical propositions. This is an integral element of what tino 
rangatiratanga is about. 
In Aotearoa New Zealand and elsewhere, across the Left 
and the Right, a liberal consensus has developed which main-
tains that parliamentary democracy with capitalist economics is 
the best possible system for ordering society. The Right manages 
the status quo; the Left is an ‘adjustment variable,’ coming to 
power ‘when public opinion has to be readjusted to capitalism,’ 
and to temper capitalism’s worst excesses without challenging 
its structure.20 This consensus, of which our constitutional ortho-
doxy is an essential part, is responsible not only for the distribu-
tion of roles and resources in society; more insidiously, it also 
defines ‘the configuration of the perceptible . . . the allocation of 
ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying . . . it is an order 
19 Ibid., 150.
20 Alain Badiou with Fabien Tarby, Philosophy and the Event, trans. Louise Burch-
ill (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 3-5.
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of the visible and sayable’.21 This control over the ‘distribution of 
the sensible’ pre-determines what is perceivable as realistic and 
possible, thereby severely limiting our ability to think politics 
and constitutionalism creatively.22 Participating in parliamen-
tary democracy is today widely considered to be the extent of 
political participation for a polity’s members. However, partici-
pation in this ‘democratic’ system of profoundly limited options 
is not political, nor qualitatively democratic. Our options are 
prescribed by a system forcibly introduced through colonisation 
and responsible for the loss of Māori legal and political power. It 
tells us to vote every three years but offers nothing beyond the 
status quo to vote for, and no opportunity to vote on the structure 
of the system itself. The insidiousness of political and economic 
consensus limits the possibilities for more political politics, for 
thinking democracy and constitutionalism differently, outside of 
the distribution of the sensible. 
Thus, while constitutional orthodoxy is presented and 
perceived as natural, neutral, and universal, with its ‘rhetoric 
of impartiality and equality’,23 it is in fact philosophically par-
ticular, ontologically restrictive, and participates in enclosing 
the distribution of the sensible. Recognising this opens space for 
creatively thinking the possibility of something essentially differ-
ent. A postcolonial politics that challenges the very foundations 
of our current order is thus not merely a particular struggle for 
Indigenous rights benefitting only tangata whenua. In exposing 
the contingency of our current constitutional order, and thinking 
something substantially different, a postcolonial praxis draws in 
21 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 29; see also Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2nd ed. (London: 
Zed Books, 2012), 40.
22 Rancière, Disagreement, 29.
23 Jackson, ‘The Treaty and the Word,’ 6.
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the entire polity to rethink democracy. I return to these themes 
when discussing the Matike Mai project below. For now, I shift 
gears, outlining Palmer and Butler’s constitutional vision and 
contextualising it within New Zealand’s constitutional orthodoxy. 
A constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand: Colonial 
continuation
In this section, I begin by articulating Palmer and Butler’s con-
stitutional vision, showing its general consistency with current 
orthodoxy. I then relate this orthodoxy to the colonial liberal 
political theory from which it derives—in particular, the con-
cepts of Hobbesian sovereignty and legal positivism—showing 
how this is reflected in the Treaty’s changing legal status over 
time. I argue that the Treaty’s place in Palmer and Butler’s 
vision presents no serious challenge to Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
current distribution of the sensible. Rather, it is a manifestation 
and continuation of colonial discourse which, despite recent ‘pro-
gress’, essentially disregards Māori perspectives on the meaning 
and constitutional significance of te Tiriti, adhering instead to a 
wholly Pākehā interpretive framework. 
Palmer and Butler’s constitutional vision
Aotearoa New Zealand currently has an uncodified constitu-
tion, an uncommon situation internationally. This constitution 
is fragmented, consisting ‘of a hodgepodge of rules, some legally 
binding, others not. It is formed by a jumble of statutes . . . ; a 
plethora of obscure conventions, letters, patents and manuals; 
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and a raft of decisions of the courts’.24 For Palmer and Butler, this 
creates an accessibility issue, the result being that many New 
Zealanders do not understand our constitutional arrangements.25 
The authors argue that this contributes to a general sense of apa-
thy about constitutional matters and a mistrust of the political 
system.26 The first aim of their book is to remedy this inacces-
sibility, to coherently set out, in one place, the rules of the con-
stitution.27 The authors also contend that it is difficult to have a 
national constitutional conversation because we lack a tangible, 
clear proposal with which to engage.28 Their proposed constitu-
tion is therefore a means of igniting this conversation; it is pre-
liminary, with the intention of revision, once the public has had 
a chance to engage, within an intended timeframe of one year.29 
The proposal ‘is not meant as a simple restatement of 
our constitutional framework as it is now’; it is ‘also an aspira-
tional and reformist project’.30 While it is ‘at pains to preserve 
the sound elements of our past and our unique constitutional 
culture’,31 it also proposes substantive changes, all deriving 
from the various stated purposes of the project: accessibility 
and certainty; civic education; enhancement of the rule of law; 
democratic accountability and transparency; ensuring protec-
tion of citizens’ rights; creating a new New Zealand head of 
state; recording national identity and preserving the useful 
elements of the current system; and, finally, creating a consti-
24 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 9-10.
25 Ibid., 10-12.
26 Ibid., 24-25.
27 Ibid., 11.
28 Ibid., 12.
29 Ibid., 8. I note here again that Palmer and Butler’s follow-up book, Towards Dem-
ocratic Renewal: Ideas for Constitutional Change in New Zealand, was released in 
April 2018, after the writing of this article.
30 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 12.
31 Ibid., 7.
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tution that ‘belongs to the people’.32
Parts 4-8 of the proposed constitution, regarding the 
membership and distribution of functions of the government, the 
parliament and legislature, law-making, and the judiciary, are 
relatively non-controversial.33 Although there are some slight 
procedural changes, these provisions mostly parallel already 
existing provisions in the Constitution Act 1986, supplemented 
by codification of rules currently covered by the Cabinet Manual 
or left up to convention, and provisions from the Judicature Act 
1908 and the Supreme Court Act 2003.34 This overall consistency 
with current practice suggests that these are elements of our cur-
rent constitutional structures that the authors consider worth 
preserving and strengthening. 
More significant changes in parts 2 and 3 would shift 
Aotearoa New Zealand from a constitutional monarchy to a 
republic.35 While we would remain in the Commonwealth (arti-
cle 8), article 2 replaces the entity ‘the Crown’ with that of ‘the 
State of Aotearoa New Zealand’. Article 9 provides for the ‘Head 
of State’, which would no longer be the ‘Sovereign in right of New 
Zealand’ represented by the governor-general, as per section 2 of 
the Constitution Act 1986, but a New Zealander appointed by a 
vote of the House of Representatives. The head of state would be 
responsible for most of the functions currently performed by the 
governor-general (article 10). However, these functions would now 
legally derive from the constitution itself, rather than the royal 
32 Ibid., 25-27.
33 Ibid., 39-60.
34 The Senior Courts Act 2016, which took over from these acts, was passed after the 
book’s publication.
35 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 35-39.
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prerogative,36 which article 13 would abolish. These changes are 
intended to achieve relative constitutional consistency in terms of 
function, while legally and symbolically reflecting Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s status as an independent nation with unique national 
identity.37 The authors do not see these proposals as radical, but 
inevitable, particularly when Queen Elizabeth dies.38
Part 12 of the proposed constitution incorporates a bill 
of rights,39 including most of the provisions of the current Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, and introducing some new rights, including a 
right to a state education (article 94); a right to property (arti-
cle 104); environmental rights (article 105); and non-justiciable 
‘social and economic rights’ (article 106).40
Particularly relevant to this article is part 11: Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi.41 Article 72 recognises and 
affirms the Treaty rights, duties, and obligations of Māori, and 
36 The royal prerogative is a legal source of executive authority vested in a monarch. 
It derives from the time when monarchs exercised full sovereign power, but has 
since been progressively whittled away as monarchies were superseded by par-
liamentary sovereignty. In the case of Aotearoa New Zealand, what is left of this 
authority is delegated to the governor-general as the Queen’s representative. As 
Palmer and Butler note (95-96), the royal prerogative in Aotearoa New Zealand 
has ‘shadowy and undefined limits,’ making the legal situation around it ‘unclear 
and inaccessible.’
37 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 19.
38 Ibid., 19.
39 Ibid., 63-70.
40 ‘Non-justiciable’ issues are those considered inappropriate for courts to judge on 
and are therefore outside their purview. Often, non-justiciability derives from the 
separation of powers. For example, issues of national security are non-justiciable, 
considered to be the concern of the executive, not the courts. It is interesting that 
Palmer and Butler would exclude socio-economic rights (which in Article 106 of 
this proposal include rights to: ‘an adequate standard of living’; ‘social security’; 
‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’; 
collective action and strikes; satisfactory health and safety conditions at work; 
and ‘the right of workers to earn their living in an occupation freely entered upon’) 
from justiciability. There is a view that court processes are ‘not always adequate 
to the task’ of adjudicating on such issues and should not be called upon to do so, 
but that citizens should still ‘be able to draw on [these rights] to make State insti-
tutions accountable’: ibid., 171.
41 Ibid., 62.
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would vest in ‘the State’ those currently vested in the Crown. 
The Treaty is to be ‘considered as always speaking’ and ‘applied 
to circumstances as they arise so that effect may be given to its 
spirit, intent, and principles’.  The full text of the Treaty, both 
the English and Māori versions, is set out in an appendix. Sig-
nificantly, this would be the first time in New Zealand history 
that the Treaty would have the general status of law.42
The most significant legal change proposed by Palmer 
and Butler’s constitution, underlying and giving weight to the 
rest of its provisions, particularly parts 11 and 12, is that it 
would have the status of entrenched, higher law, enforceable 
by the courts. In terms of entrenchment, article 116 provides 
that the Constitution cannot be amended, unless with the sup-
port of a 75 percent majority in the house, or a majority in a 
national referendum (striking a ‘balance between representa-
tive democracy and direct deliberative democracy’), with the 
exception that the appendix containing the Treaty texts cannot 
be amended.43 In terms of supremacy, article 1 states: ‘Where 
there is an inconsistency between any law and any provision of 
this Constitution, the provision of this Constitution prevails’.44 
Article 68 gives the courts power to declare that a law incon-
sistent with the Constitution is invalid; if the Supreme Court 
confirms this, the inconsistent law will be invalidated, unless 
parliament passes a ‘validating Act’, with the support of 75 per-
42 Ibid., 147.
43 Ibid., 23, 75. Ordinarily, all that is required to amend or appeal a piece of legisla-
tion is a bare majority in the House of Representatives. Entrenchment provisions 
are relatively uncommon where there is a strong sense of parliamentary suprem-
acy, the idea being that parliament as a democratically elected body should have 
the unfettered ability to change law as it deems appropriate. The major entrench-
ment provision in Aotearoa New Zealand currently is s 268 of the Electoral Act, 
which implements safeguards in relation to, inter alia, the term of parliament, 
the voting age, and the secret ballot.
44 Ibid., 35. This would give the constitution higher status than all other statutes. 
Currently, all statutes passed by parliament have equal legal status.
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cent of the house, determining that the inconsistent law will 
remain in effect.45 This is the balance struck between constitu-
tional safeguards for rights and parliamentary sovereignty of a 
‘softer’ kind.46 In the authors’ words, ‘Parliament, as an elected 
body, should have the final word’.47
Palmer and Butler’s proposal is a particular vision of 
what a healthy modern democratic constitution should look like: 
a reflection of the nation it governs, protection of the rule of law, 
a clear separation of powers with rigorous checks and balances, 
protection of rights, and accountability to ‘the people’. They note 
that 19th-century notions of parliamentary sovereignty, accord-
ing to which parliament ‘should be able to change any law it likes 
at speed with a small majority at any time,’ is outdated: ‘parlia-
mentary sovereignty needs to yield to popular sovereignty and 
participatory democracy’.48 While they consider that the ‘political 
skills’ of Members of Parliament are still ‘essential to the run-
ning of a representative democracy’,49 ‘ultimately a constitution 
must stand above the interests of any particular political party or 
political philosophy. It must belong to all of the people because it 
is under their will that government is conducted in a democracy. 
They are the ultimate authority, not Parliament’.50
We can question what the authors mean by ‘political 
philosophy’ here. As discussed earlier, the ideological framework 
from within which the authors propose this constitution is very 
clearly derived from the history of colonial philosophy—that is, 
where the conception of the various organs of the state, and the 
ideas of the separation of powers, the rule of law, and parliamen-
45 Ibid., 59-60.
46 Ibid., 20.
47 Ibid., 21.
48 Ibid., 16
49 Ibid., 17.
50 Ibid., 23.
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tary sovereignty, come from. Similarly, the authors say that the 
nature of New Zealand’s political economy should be determined 
through politics, not provided for by a constitution, apparently 
not recognising the close relationship and mutual reinforcement 
between institutional arrangements and the economic status 
quo.51 Their vision is not ‘above’ any particular political phi-
losophy, but deeply embedded within one. Because the distribu-
tion of the sensible in Aotearoa New Zealand prescribes what 
is constitutionally possible in these terms of colonial origin, and 
Palmer and Butler’s vision follows the logic of this distribution of 
the sensible, they can represent their constitution as politically 
neutral and relatively non-controversial. 
Next, I further explore how this is so, identifying two 
principles of liberal political philosophy—Hobbesian sovereignty 
and legal positivism—integral to the colonial legal system, and 
demonstrating how these have influenced the orthodox view of 
the Treaty’s constitutional place.
The Treaty’s status in constitutional orthodoxy
The idea that the Treaty of Waitangi was a cession of sovereignty 
by rangatira to the British Crown is the ‘dominant Pākehā nar-
rative of the founding of New Zealand’. In this narrative, Māori 
are understood to have given up their sovereignty in article 1 in 
exchange for property rights in article 2 and equality in article 3. 
The Treaty is portrayed as a benign act that has benefitted Māori 
and as the political basis for the Crown’s sovereignty.52
With this exchange, Westminster parliamentary sover-
eignty was ‘legally’ imposed upon these lands, understood within 
the conceptual frameworks of British law and, more broadly, 
51 Ibid., 17.
52 Emily Blincoe, ‘The Myth of Cession: Public Law Textbooks and the Treaty of 
Waitangi,’ Public Interest Law Journal of New Zealand 3 (2016): 127.
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colonial liberal philosophy.53 These British legal concepts are 
important for understanding how the Treaty has been under-
stood in the history of New Zealand constitutional orthodoxy. 
Thomas Hobbes’s 17th-century theory of sovereignty was 
very influential, including upon John Austin, whose ideas about 
sovereignty ‘came to dominate British legal thought in the period 
following the signing of the Treaty’.54 For Hobbes, irresolvable disa-
greement in society is inevitable, a notion tied to a liberal ontology 
and moral philosophy of individualism and self-interest whereby 
social relations are inherently conflictual.55 For order to obtain, 
there must be a procedure by which such conflict can be arbitrated, 
and an ultimate authority responsible for this: Hobbes’s sovereign 
Leviathan.56 For this to work, the sovereign’s word must be final; 
therefore the sovereign must be unitary, and its authority must 
be ‘ultimate, unlimited, and absolute’.57 There could thus be no 
legal limit on the sovereign’s power, but for practical reasons, to 
preserve social harmony, there may be political or moral limits.58 
Legal positivism, according to which, rather circularly, law is valid 
so long as it is passed in accordance with rules about how law is 
to be passed, was also a prominent British legal orthodoxy at this 
time. The conceptual combination of legal positivism and Hobbe-
sian sovereignty, in the institutional context of Westminster rep-
53 Jackson, ‘The Treaty and the Word,’ 6.
54 Stephen Davies and R E Ewin, ‘Sovereigns, Sovereignty, and the Treaty of Wait-
angi,’ in Justice, Ethics & New Zealand Society, ed. Graham Oddie and Roy Per-
rett (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 54n1.
55 Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal Theory, 2nd edition (Oxon: Routledge, 
2004), 131. Although, it should be noted that this idea of permanent and ineradi-
cable conflict is shared by many, so-called, ‘radical democrats’ such as Chantal 
Mouffe and Jacques Rancière. However, unlike Hobbes, these thinkers argue that 
the permanence of disagreement and antagonism is the constitutive condition of 
politics. As such, neutralising disagreement through the word of the sovereign 
sees politics itself disappear.
56 Davies and Ewin, ‘Sovereigns, Sovereignty, and the Treaty of Waitangi,’ 42.
57 Ibid., 42-43.
58 Ibid., 43.
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resentative democracy, means that only law properly passed by 
parliament is valid, and it cannot be invalidated.
These concepts framed New Zealand’s early and ongoing 
constitutional arrangements. The idea of unitary absolute sov-
ereignty made it inconceivable to English legal minds that the 
Treaty was an agreement to sovereign power sharing, or dual 
sovereignty, between the Crown and rangatira; this is not legally 
possible in terms of Hobbesian sovereignty and so Māori claims 
to sovereignty have never been recognised by the New Zealand 
state. Additionally, because treaties are solely within the pur-
view of executive government, and there was no legislative effort 
to solidify the Treaty’s legal status (with a near complete absence 
of legislative reference to the Treaty prior to 1975),59 the Treaty 
did not have the status of domestic law and, according to legal 
positivism, could not be enforced in the courts. This severity is 
classically reflected in the 1877 Wi Parata decision, in which 
Chief Justice Prendergast declared the Treaty a ‘simple nullity’.60 
The essence of this approach ‘was that Māori rights existed at 
the mere sufferance of the Crown,’ as per Hobbesian sovereignty 
and legal positivism.61
When the Māori resistance movement began to grow in 
the 1970s—partially due to increasing Māori urbanisation post-
war,62 and partially in the spirit and context of the growth of 
59 Tama W Potaka, ‘Legislation and the Legislature,’ in Weeping Waters: The Treaty 
of Waitangi and Constitutional Change, ed. Malcolm Mulholland and Veronica 
Tawhai (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2010), 85.
60 Paul McHugh, ‘Legal Reasoning and the Treaty of Waitangi: Orthodox and Radi-
cal Approaches,’ in Justice, Ethics & New Zealand Society, ed. Graham Oddie and 
Roy Perrett (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 93; see also Jane Kelsey, 
‘Judicialisation of the Treaty of Waitangi: A Subtle Cultural Repositioning,’ Aus-
tralian Journal of Law and Society 10 (1994): 132.
61 McHugh, ‘Legal Reasoning and the Treaty of Waitangi,’ 93.
62 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou: Struggle Without End, 209.
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the New Left internationally,63 —race relations grew tense, and 
complete disregard of the Treaty became politically untenable.64 
In Hobbesian terms, we can see here how, despite having no legal 
status, the Treaty became a political constraint upon the Crown’s 
exercise of sovereignty. 
The unrest led to the creation of the Waitangi Tribu-
nal by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, which had the power to 
investigate contemporary Treaty breaches, but not historic griev-
ances until amended in 1985. The tribunal has never had a gen-
eral jurisdiction to make binding recommendations; the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act did not, therefore, implement serious constitutional 
change. It was important symbolically and politically, however, 
catalysing the Treaty-settlements process, increasing legislative 
references to the Treaty and its ‘principles’, and creating space 
for mainstream discussion of the Treaty’s status. For example, 
it was held in the 1987 Huakina Development Trust case that it 
would not be unorthodox for the Treaty to be used as an extrinsic 
aid to statutory interpretation where appropriate, particularly in 
the context of administrative law, with Justice Chilwell stating 
that ‘there can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of 
New Zealand society’.65
The visibility of the Treaty and increased Māori political 
power impacted on the Fourth Labour Government’s privatisation 
programme, contributing to the introduction of section 9 in the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 which stated: ‘Nothing in this 
Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner inconsistent with 
63 Evan S. Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai: The Evolution of Contempo-
rary Maori Protest,’ in Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, ed. Paul Spoonley, Cluny Macpherson, and David Pearson (Palmerston 
North: Dunmore Press, 1996), 98-102.
64 Kelsey, ‘Judicialisation of the Treaty of Waitangi,’ 133.
65 High Court, Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 
NZLR 188, 210.
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the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’.66 There had been con-
cern among Māori that the programme, by transferring land out 
of state ownership and into private hands, may prejudice Treaty 
claims.67 Claimants sought judicial review of the Crown’s proposed 
asset sales in a landmark case that ‘was to become a turning point 
in Treaty jurisprudence’.68 In the 1987 ‘Lands’ case, in what has 
been called judicial activism, or, less pejoratively, ‘creativity’, the 
‘Court of Appeal was unanimous in holding that section 9, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, overrode the whole of the Act’, 
and therefore the assets could not legally be transferred without 
due observation of ‘Treaty principles’.69 The case also commenced 
the judicial formulation of the Treaty principles in the language of 
good faith, partnership, active protection, and, crucially, the rela-
tionship between the Treaty terms of kāwanatanga and tino ran-
gatiratanga, which the court saw as the Crown’s sovereign right 
to govern, and the right of Māori to exercise self-determination.70 
This Treaty jurisprudence has grown and developed since the 
1980s, and is now on relatively firm footing in our constitutional 
orthodoxy, which can thus be characterised as ‘dynamic’, rather 
than static,71 an ostensibly ‘bicultural’ legal system.72 
This orthodoxy is reflected in Palmer and Butler’s pro-
posal. They say that ‘the legitimacy of the government we have 
66 Linda Te Aho ‘Judicial Creativity,’ in Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi 
and Constitutional Change, ed. Malcolm Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (Wel-
lington: Huia Publishers, 2010), 113-114.
67 Waitangi Tribunal, Interim Report to the Minister of Māori Affairs on State-
Owned Enterprises Bill (Wai 22), 1986.
68 Te Aho, ‘Judicial Creativity,’ 114.
69 Court of Appeal, New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 
641; Te Aho, ‘Judicial Creativity,’ 114.
70 Court of Appeal, New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General; see also Kelsey, 
‘Judicialisation of the Treaty of Waitangi,’ 137.
71 McHugh, ‘Legal Reasoning and the Treaty of Waitangi’.
72 See Kelsey, ‘Judicialisation of the Treaty of Waitangi,’ for an extended discussion 
of the constitutional nuances of the courts’ approach to early Treaty jurisprudence.
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in New Zealand today owes much to the Treaty,’ but because the 
Treaty still does not have the status of general law, ‘its legal effect 
is inconsistent, incoherent, and uncertain’.73 Therefore the ‘prime 
reason for making the Treaty part of the Constitution is that it 
is already part of our informal constitutional arrangements, 
but its legal and constitutional effect is currently contested and 
uncertain’.74 Their constitution would regularise and protect the 
current status-quo approach to the Treaty’s constitutional place, 
a necessary stability because ‘the relationships between Māori 
and the State are vital to the peace, order, and good government 
of New Zealand’.75 The courts would still have the power to give 
effect to the Treaty as cases require, and the obligation of the gov-
ernment and parliament to give effect to it would be confirmed 
and protected.76
It is arguable that the Treaty having the status of 
supreme, entrenched law would increase the constitutional 
and legal power of tangata whenua by increasing their ability 
to enforce the Treaty’s terms. To an extent this is true—this is 
a stated intention of the proposal. However, it is clear that it 
is the ‘dynamic’ constitutional orthodoxy, and the principles of 
the Treaty as developed in official Treaty jurisprudence—not te 
Tiriti as understood in tikanga Māori terms—that are to reign. 
Although Palmer and Butler acknowledge contestation over the 
Treaty’s interpretation,77 and do not explicitly assert that the 
Treaty was a cession of sovereignty, but rather intended as ‘some 
sort of power-sharing relationship’,78 their vision is essentially in 
line with how the Treaty has come to be seen by Pākehā ortho-
73 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 147.
74 Ibid., 154.
75 Ibid., 156.
76 Ibid., 146.
77 Ibid., 154.
78 Ibid., 151.
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doxy: offering some resource and management rights, but always 
subject to parliamentary sovereignty, which, although softened 
in Palmer and Butler’s constitution, retains ultimate authority. 
Palmer notes that ‘people are very frightened of’ tino 
rangatiratanga, but that all it means, uncontroversially, is that 
‘Māori should be able to control and have a say over their own 
resources’.79 This limited orthodox Pākehā view of the meaning 
of tino rangatiratanga is reflected in Palmer and Butler’s con-
stitutional vision, which, still broadly in line with the ideas of 
Hobbesian sovereignty and legal positivism, has no room for 
any concept of shared sovereignty, or of tino rangatiratanga as 
understood according to a tangata whenua perspective as the 
exercise of a deep and substantive self-determination going well 
beyond resources. (Notably, Palmer and Butler did not consult 
with tangata whenua prior to the release of A Constitution for 
Aotearoa New Zealand, although they acknowledge the Matike 
Mai report.)80 As Ani Mikaere notes regarding the development 
of Treaty jurisprudence, while the harsh Wi Parata perspective 
on the Treaty has fallen out of favour:81
It has largely been replaced by a range of views that are, in reality, 
no less oppressive, despite being conveyed in the soothing language 
of partnership, mutual respect, or aboriginal rights. While Prender-
gast’s overt racism has for the most part been spurned in favour of 
greater cultural sensitivity, any concessions that are made to Māori 
aspirations of tino rangatiratanga . . .  are nevertheless envisaged 
as occurring within the framework of Crown sovereignty. As such 
they represent the false generosity of the oppressor.
79 Salient, ‘Interview with Sir Geoffrey Palmer,’ May 19, 2017. http://salient.org.
nz/2017/05/interview-geoffrey-palmer/.
80 Palmer and Butler, A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 158-159.
81 Quoted in Te Aho, ‘Judicial Creativity,’ 115.
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Next, I seek to further unsettle the perceived neutrality of our 
constitutional orthodoxy through a discussion of te Tiriti’s mean-
ing as understood in accordance with tikanga and mātauranga 
Māori, and the reflection of this in Matike Mai’s project. To final-
ly move towards decolonisation and Treaty justice requires rec-
ognising the philosophical biases in the dominant colonial frame-
work. As the Matike Mai report states, it is questionable ‘whether 
a State built upon the taking of another people’s lands, lives, and 
power can ever really be just or Treaty-based if it maintains a 
constitutional order that was part of the taking’.82
He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mo Aotearoa in context: 
Ontological and sovereign plurality
The terms of reference given to the Matike Mai working group 
in embarking on their research were ‘deliberately broad’: ‘To 
develop and implement a model for an inclusive Constitution 
for Aotearoa based on tikanga and kawa, He Whakaputanga o 
te Rangatiratanga o Niu Tireni of 1835, Te Tiriti o Waitangi of 
1840, and other Indigenous human rights instruments which 
enjoy a wide degree of international recognition’.83
The endeavour was not to be framed in terms of our cur-
rent Westminster constitutional system and its legal theory, but 
rather within the framework of Māori law, in accordance with 
which he Whakaputanga and te Tiriti were to be read.84 There-
fore, the report does not engage closely with the constitutional 
views maintained by the Crown since 1840, ‘and especially its 
82 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 29.
83 Ibid., 7.
84 Ibid., 7.
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presumption that Iwi and Hapū ceded sovereignty in Te Tiriti’, 
noting that these views ‘have always been at odds with Māori 
understandings’.85 This project is about Māori talking to Māori, 
in Māori terms, about a different type of constitutionalism 
altogether.86
Ma-ori philosophy and law
Grasping the full import of Matike Mai’s constitutional vision, 
and the challenge it presents to the orthodox view, requires at 
least a basic understanding of Māori law, the philosophical per-
spective underpinning it, and how he Whakaputanga and te Tiri-
ti were and are seen within this framework. As a Pākehā intellec-
tual, my understanding of this philosophy and law is inherently 
limited, learnt from books and university study rather than any 
direct experience—this must be kept in mind when reading this 
section. I do not purport to be an expert, but have tried to the 
best of my ability to represent this philosophy as it has been 
presented by Māori thinkers (the Waitangi Tribunal’s 2014 Wai 
1040 report also gives a detailed exposition of these ideas).
Prior to colonisation, tangata whenua had a distinct 
system of law—tikanga—that still exists despite its violent dis-
ruption by colonisation (which includes, of course, the overlaying 
of tikanga by Pākehā law and sovereignty).87 Tikanga, although 
varying between iwi and hapū of different regions, has reasonably 
consistent central tenets. Of these, Justice Joe Williams identi-
fies whanaungatanga, or ‘the source of the rights and obligations 
of kinship’, as the conceptual ‘glue that held, and still holds, the 
system together; the idea that makes the whole system make 
85 Ibid., 8.
86 Ibid., 7-8.
87 I would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewer who emphasised the need to 
discuss tikanga in the present tense.
133Lockie: Decolonising Constitutionalism
sense—including legal sense’.88 The centrality of whanaungatanga 
is related to Māori ontology. In te ao Māori, a person’s place in 
the universe is understood ‘through the principle of whakapapa—
genealogical progression—in which all things [can] be traced back 
in a logical sequence to the beginning of creation. Through this 
principle, all people and all elements of the physical and spiritual 
worlds [are] seen as related at a fundamental level’.89  
The idea that all things—people past, present, and 
future; nature; the spiritual—are related through kinship cre-
ates a very different philosophical foundation for law than that 
derived of a Christian cosmology.90 The latter separates and hier-
archises the spiritual, the human, and the natural: humanity 
rules over nature, and people are ultimately individually respon-
sible for acting virtuously to be rewarded in the afterlife. This 
ontological and philosophical difference provides insight into the 
differences between Māori and English legal systems.91
Whanaungatanga underlies other central tikanga prin-
ciples, for example, mana, ‘the source of rights and obligations 
of leadership’; tapu, ‘both a social control on behaviour and evi-
dence of the indivisibility of the divine and the profane’; utu, ‘the 
obligation to give and the right (and sometimes obligation) to 
receive constant reciprocity’; and kaitiakitanga, ‘the obligation to 
care for one’s own’.92 Whanaungatanga orders the rights and obli-
gations of the Māori legal system. For example, resource rights 
88 Joseph Williams, ‘Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic Attempt to Map the Māori Dimension 
in Modern New Zealand Law,’ Waikato Law Review 21 (2013): 3-4.
89 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the 
Treaty, 20.
90 Shane Malva, ‘Indigenous Knowledge, Continental Philosophy, and the Politi-
cal Real,’ paper presented at Social Movements, Resistance, and Social Change: 
Beyond Capitalism, Beyond Colonisation, Massey University Auckland, Septem-
ber 7, 2017; Jackson, ‘The Treaty and the Word,’ 2.
91 See also Avril Bell, ‘Co-existing Indigenous and Settler Worlds: Ontological Styles 
and Possibilities,’ Journal of New Zealand Studies NS24 (2017).
92 Williams, ‘Lex Aotearoa,’ 3-4.
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are obtained primarily through descent, and cannot be sustained 
without an ongoing relationship with the resource, including 
the obligation to care for it; criminal or tortious behaviour is the 
responsibility of the perpetrator’s wider kin group, and a wrong 
against the victim’s wider kin group.93 Whanaungatanga is also 
central to political authority and organisation. 
Pre-colonisation, ‘the fundamental unit of economic and 
political organisation [in Aotearoa] was the hapū’.94 Hapū are 
‘political and economic groupings based on a combination of com-
mon descent and interest,’ made up of whānau working togeth-
er ‘in larger kin-based groups under coordinated leadership’.95 
Hapū, which, in English legal terms, could be characterised as 
small sovereign units, hold the rights in territorial land, with 
political leadership being exercised by rangatira.96 However, 
the authority—mana—of rangatira does not vest in them as 
individuals. Rather, they embody ‘the mana of their atua, the 
ancestor-gods from whom the other members of their hapū also 
descended’.97 Moreover, mana can wax or wane depending on 
how well rangatira carry out their leadership roles: ‘in all of 
these things, their mana and that of their people and whenua 
[are] closely aligned. Mana, in other words, [is] bestowed by vir-
tue of their relationships with people . . . land . . . and tūpuna’.98 
This political organisation and source of authority is central for 
understanding the import of he Whakaputanga and te Tiriti.
93 Ibid., 4-5.
94 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the 
Treaty, 30.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.; Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 30, 34-35.
97 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the 
Treaty, 31.
98 Ibid.; see also Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 35
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He Whakaputanga and te Tiriti
Settlers had been coming to Aotearoa for some time by the 1830s 
and 1840s, but the law of the land was that of hapū under the 
leadership of rangatira.99 There was concern among hapū about 
the lawlessness of Pākehā immigrants, a problem that need-
ed to be dealt with collaboratively. This was the background 
to He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Niu Tireni 1835, 
the Declaration of Independence signed by Te Whakaminenga 
o ngā Hapū, the United Tribes. (Note that this did not include 
all hapū, but primarily those in the north, where most Pākehā 
were settling.)100
He Whakaputanga, partially conceived by rangatira who 
had met the King of England when there for trade, and drawn up 
by British Resident James Busby, was ‘a declaration of the ran-
gatiratanga and the mana of the rangatira of te Whakaminenga in 
respect of all their lands’.101 It ‘declared that the rangatira would 
not allow any other persons or any other “kāwanatanga” to have 
law-making powers over their lands’.102 There were translational 
issues—‘independence’ in the English text imperfectly translated 
to ‘rangatiratanga’; ‘sovereignty’ was translated to ‘kingitanga’, 
an English-derived term—but, regardless, King William IV for-
mally acknowledged the document, which in English explicitly 
stated that rangatira held sovereign power over the independent 
state of New Zealand.103 Meanwhile, the Declaration provided for 
iwi and hapū to ‘come together in a Whakaminenga or assembly 
to make joint decisions on matters of common concern’.104 Matike 
99 Margaret Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts,’ in 
Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional Change, ed. Malcolm 
Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2010), 16.
100 Ibid., 16-17.
101 Ibid., 17-18.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 44.
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Mai characterises he Whakaputanga as a ‘constitutional trans-
formation in which Iwi and Hapū would exercise an independ-
ent authority while retaining their own independence’,105 a new 
federal-like constitutional arrangement, necessary in the new 
circumstances of Aotearoa.
He Whakaputanga provides crucial context for the 
Māori understanding of te Tiriti. While the English text of the 
Treaty was framed and understood in English legal terms as an 
explicit cession of sovereignty, te Tiriti, very imperfectly trans-
lated, did not say as much.106 In article 1, rangatira allowed the 
Crown ‘kāwanatanga’, again an English-derived term, conveying 
an idea of governance, to meet the need for control over British 
settlers.107 This contrasts with he Whakaputanga, which disal-
lowed any foreign kāwanatanga. The word in he Whakaputanga 
that had been used as the translation of sovereignty, kingitanga, 
was not used. Article 1 of te Tiriti therefore did not convey a ces-
sion of sovereignty. Meanwhile, article 2 reserved for rangatira 
their tino rangatiratanga which, rather than conveying the idea 
of ‘full exclusive and undisturbed possession’ of their material 
property, as the English text stated,108 had much more political 
connotation, more likely referring to ‘paramount and ultimate 
105 Ibid.
106 I only briefly discuss the discrepancies between the English and Māori Treaty 
texts here, assuming this to be relatively well-known, or at least covered suffi-
ciently elsewhere (see, for example, Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions,’ and Wait-
angi Tribunal He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the Treaty, 
chapter 10). As Linda Te Aho notes, ‘in any event, the Crown has failed to adhere 
to either version’: Te Aho, ‘Judicial Creativity,’ 113.
107 Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions,’ 24-25.
108 The full language used in the English-language text is ‘full exclusive and undis-
turbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other proper-
ties which they may collectively or individually possess.’
137Lockie: Decolonising Constitutionalism
authority’ over their material and non-material possessions.109  
In discussions of te Tiriti’s poor translation, tino ran-
gatiratanga is often translated as sovereignty.110 Some might 
argue that tino rangatiratanga should have been the phrasing 
used to convey the cession of sovereignty in article 1, rather 
than the retaining of property rights in article 2. However, while 
rangatiratanga, and the corresponding concept mana, does not 
refer simply to property rights, it is also not an accurate transla-
tion of the English concept of sovereignty, because it arises out 
of an altogether different legal and philosophical framework.111 
‘Tino rangatiratanga is the exercise of paramount and spiritually 
sanctioned power and authority’, including notions associated 
with sovereignty, but wider, due to its ‘strong spiritual connota-
tions’.112 Had sovereignty been translated as tino rangatiratanga, 
no rangatira would have agreed to te Tiriti;113 they could not do 
so according to Māori law.114 Because the authority—mana—of 
rangatira derived from whakapapa (human, natural, and spirit-
ual), it ‘could not be broken or transferred’.115 It derived from the 
ancestors of the rangatira and was therefore not theirs to cede; it 
was inalienable.116 What the English text of the Treaty purported 
109 The full language used in the Māori text is ‘te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua 
o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa,’ which translates literally as ‘paramount 
and ultimate power and authority over their lands, their villages and all their 
treasured possessions’: Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions,’ 25. Not only does this 
indicate a different level of authority being retained in the Māori text, but also 
a wider understanding of what that authority was retained over, going beyond 
simple material possessions.
110 Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions,’ 26.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., 31.
114 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 35; Blincoe, ‘The Myth 
of Cession,’ 135-136.
115 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the 
Treaty, 24.
116 Blincoe, ‘The Myth of Cession,’ 135-136.
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to do was ‘unthinkable in terms of tikanga’.117 
Rather, te Tiriti was envisaged by rangatira, accord-
ing to tikanga, as a substantive power-sharing arrangement: 
the Crown would have authority to control British subjects and 
thereby protect Māori, while rangatira would retain their law-
making and -enforcement authority over their people and land.118 
As the Waitangi Tribunal has found:119 
The rangatira consented to the Treaty on the basis that they and 
the [Crown] were to be equals, though they were to have different 
roles and different spheres of influence. The details of how this rela-
tionship would work in practice, especially where the Māori and 
European populations intermingled, remained to be negotiated over 
time on a case-by-case basis.
Because the Crown ‘petulantly’ enforced its own understand-
ing of the Treaty, according to the colonial legal philosophical 
framework of Hobbesian sovereignty and legal positivism, there-
by overpowering and displacing the Māori legal and philosophi-
cal framework, this constitutional arrangement envisaged and 
agreed to by rangatira never came to fruition.120 However, this 
vision was not abandoned, and is reflected in Matike Mai’s vision 
for constitutional transformation. As their report notes, the 
Māori communities they engaged with were clear that these con-
stitutional documents are ‘fundamentally relevant because they 
all express the right for Māori to make decisions for Māori that is 
the very essence of tino rangatiratanga’.121
117 Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions,’ 31.
118 Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti / The Declaration and the 
Treaty, 529.
119 Ibid.
120 Jackson, ‘The Treaty and the Word,’ 6.
121 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 8.
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Matike Mai’s kaupapa and vision
The Matike Mai report was developed out of extensive consulta-
tion with Māori communities over three years; around the country, 
252 hui were conducted, in addition to 70 wānanga with rangata-
hi.122 It was important that the project reach a broad cross-section 
of Māori, wherever they were, and so the discussions were held 
in a range of locations and environments—marae, kura, tertiary 
institutions, health and social service clinics, law offices, gang 
properties, private homes, and a prison.123 The Working Group 
was aware that constitutional discussion might not be a top prior-
ity for the people with whom they were seeking to engage, but that 
the exercise of constitutional authority touched upon the everyday 
lives of all people and ‘if they did not know the constitutional rhet-
oric they would certainly live its effects’. This turned out to be the 
case, with many people having an ‘almost instinctive grasp on con-
stitutional matters and their effects’.124 The hui were recorded and 
transcribed and, along with written submissions, survey findings, 
and discussions from smaller focus groups, formed the basis of the 
report’s proposals.125 While ‘there was naturally a wide range of 
views expressed’, there was nevertheless broad ‘unanimity about 
the need for some kind of constitutional change’.126 There was a 
‘firm belief that the Westminster constitutional system as it has 
been implemented since 1840 does not, indeed cannot, adequately 
give effect to the terms of Te Tiriti’.127
Part 1 of the report discusses the nature of constitutions, 
outlining the differences between ‘the Western concept and site 
of power’ and ‘the Māori concept and site of power’, reflecting 
122 Ibid., 7.
123 Ibid., 18.
124 Ibid., 15-16.
125 Ibid., 18-19.
126 Ibid., 18.
127 Ibid., 25.
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much of what has been discussed above.128 Part 2 discusses the 
‘constitutional foundations’ represented in tikanga, he Whaka-
putanga, te Tiriti, and other international Indigenous instru-
ments, again reflecting much of what has been discussed in 
the preceding parts of this paper, albeit in greater detail and 
engaging more closely with the Waitangi Tribunal’s 2014 report 
on te Tiriti and he Whakaputanga.129 Much emphasis in the hui 
was on values, and the need for constitutional values to be clear 
before a constitutional model is developed.130 Part 3 explores the 
constitutional values that were identified in the hui as impor-
tant, all sourced in the central principle of whanaungatanga.131 
These values are tikanga, in terms of whakapapa values as well 
as Māori law; community, in terms of positive human relation-
ships; belonging, of all peoples of this land; place, in terms of the 
protection of the environment; balance, between rangatiratanga 
and kāwanatanga; conciliation, in terms of conciliatory and con-
sensual, rather than adversarial and majoritarian, democracy; 
and structure, or the need for a constitution to structurally pro-
mote ‘basic democratic ideals of fair representation, openness, 
and transparency’.132 We can see parallels with Palmer and But-
ler’s vision here, although these values are derived from a differ-
ent, Māori legal history and philosophy.
Part 4 consolidates the findings of the previous three 
sections in six ‘indicative constitutional models’ that suggest 
the range of possibilities ‘available for those who really want a 
good faith honouring of Te Tiriti’, in which Crown kāwanatanga 
does not sit above rangatiratanga, but is constitutionally recon-
128 Ibid., 30-38.
129 Ibid., 39-67.
130 Ibid., 23.
131 Ibid., 69.
132 Ibid., 68-93.
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ceptualised to sit alongside it.133 These models each draw on the 
language of different ‘spheres of influence’ in the Waitangi Tri-
bunal’s 2014 report—the kāwanatanga sphere of the Crown in 
parliament, the rangatiratanga sphere of Māori authority, and a 
relational sphere for joint deliberation—envisaging the relation-
ships between these spheres in different ways, broadly rather 
than in detail, but always with equal recognition of the respec-
tive authority of kāwanatanga and rangatiratanga that te Tiriti 
was meant to ensure.134
It was not the intention of the Working Group to come 
up with a definitive draft constitution.135 Rather, the report is 
the result of the first stage of an intentionally long process of 
engagement and planning, which will include wider engagement 
with the public and the Crown; the goal for some form of consti-
tutional transformation is 2040, symbolically chosen as the 200-
year anniversary of te Tiriti.136 The report, therefore, again like 
Palmer and Butler’s book, is preliminary in nature.
Irreconcilable differences or disingenuous democracy?
Matike Mai notes that a proposal for constitutional change must 
address questions about the grounds for change, how change 
would be implemented, and how it would benefit the country.137 
This is part of their reason for going about this work slowly and 
methodically. However, they recognise a certain irony in this; 
given our colonial history, it seems more urgent for the Crown 
to justify its constitutional regime than those promoting a Tiriti-
133 Ibid., 104, 112.
134 Ibid., 104-111.
135 Ibid., 14.
136 Ibid., 11.
137 Ibid., 100.
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based constitution.138 As Moana Jackson notes, there is a kind 
of ‘verbal gymnastics’ involved in asserting that a constitutional 
regime has democratic legitimacy when it was forced on a peo-
ple non-consensually: ‘the imposition of the Westminster system 
denied the will of those being dispossessed except on its own 
terms’.139 The limited recognition of the Treaty by the Crown in 
settlements and management rights, or even in constitution-
al entrenchment in Palmer and Butler’s vision, might be ‘pro-
gressive’ in terms of the colonial legal framework, but ‘it seems 
counter-productive and somewhat circular to measure whether 
our current constitutional arrangements give appropriate effect 
to the Treaty by the yardstick’ of those constitutional arrange-
ments.140 The continued interpretation and enforcement of an 
agreement formed between two peoples with two different legal 
systems, according to only one party’s intellectual tradition with 
general disregard for the other, is a perversion of the agreement. 
It is not Treaty justice. 
Matike Mai acknowledges that, given the pervasiveness 
of our current orthodoxy, some Pākehā would dismiss the project 
as ‘unrealistic’.141 However, ‘what some might see as “unrealistic” 
discourse’ was rather, in their hui, ‘an expression of a deeply-
held understanding about what was promised in Te Tiriti’, ‘a 
reminder of how consistent Māori have been on such issues and 
how consistently the Crown has ignored them’.142 As discussed 
earlier, what is perceivable as realistic or unrealistic, possible 
138 Ibid.; Carwyn Jones, ‘Tāwhaki and Te Tiriti: A Principled Approach to the Consti-
tutional Future of the Treaty of Waitangi,’ New Zealand Universities Law Review 
25 (2013): 710.
139 Moana Jackson, ‘How about a politics that imagines the impossible?’ E-Tangata,  
September 24 2017, https://e-tangata.co.nz/news/how-about-a-politics-that-imagi 
nes-the-impossible.
140 Jones, ‘Tāwhaki and Te Tiriti,’ 706.
141 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 16.
142 Ibid., 22.
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or impossible, is not innate but constructed, and is a function of 
power through the distribution of the sensible. Given the long 
history of Māori dissensus, and political, legal, and constitutional 
scholarship, the current constitutional orthodoxy’s claims to neu-
trality and immutability, and about possibility and reality, are 
frankly untenable, disingenuous, and arrogant. The accusation 
that something is unrealistic is nothing more than an unwilling-
ness to change; our constitutional arrangements are constructed, 
and they are quite capable of being reconstructed.
We should recall Mehta’s words quoted earlier: a 
colonial order is a constitution of being. Law derives from 
the philosophy of a culture, from its perspectives on ontolo-
gy, epistemology, cosmology, and ethics. Māori constitutional 
aspirations are not simply about a greater share of political 
power, as the orthodox view would have it. They are about 
self-determination, tino rangatiratanga, the ability of tangata 
whenua to have control over their own existence and being.143 
The colonial legal system inherently limits this ability, because 
its rules are based on a different philosophy and ontology—
as evidenced here, and also, for example, in Māori efforts to 
implement change more conducive to tikanga in areas such as 
resource management, family, and criminal law.144 That is ulti-
mately the justice at stake in the tino-rangatiratanga strug-
gle. Substantive biculturalism is not possible in a monocultur-
al framework, but it is possible for these different life-worlds 
to co-exist in a more ontologically neutral space, one where 
colonial domination is recognised and undermined, and where 
te ao Māori is seen on its own terms, not through the lens 
of coloniality. It is time for Pākehā constitutional orthodoxy to 
143 See Bell, ‘Co-existing Indigenous and Settler Worlds: Ontological Styles and 
Possibilities’.
144 See Williams, ‘Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic Attempt to Map the Māori Dimension in 
Modern New Zealand Law.’
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recognise its deep biases and tendency for self-affirmation, and 
instead make a genuine effort to meet tangata whenua in the 
middle. 
Conclusion
In comparing Palmer and Butler’s A Constitution for Aotearoa 
New Zealand and Matike Mai’s He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu 
Mō Aotearoa, I have sought to displace the claims of colonial 
orthodox constitutionalism to neutrality, universality, and fair-
ness, showing rather that its cultural biases run so deep that 
they are often imperceptible. This is how insidious the current 
distribution of the sensible is. I consider Palmer and Butler to be 
locked into narrow and uncreative constitutional thinking, which 
continues to misunderstand Māori constitutional aspirations 
because it frames these within its own legal-cultural perspective, 
not on their own terms. Meanwhile, tangata whenua have con-
tinued to challenge this distribution of the sensible and seek the 
constitutional arrangements envisaged by te Tiriti; as Matike 
Mai points out, the ‘failure to honour that promise in word and 
deed remains the most egregious of all the Crown’s breaches of 
Te Tiriti’.145 What is characterised by the current distribution of 
the sensible as unrealistic is not a flight of fancy but a conceptu-
ally coherent and thoroughly considered vision that has never 
been abandoned.
As Moana Jackson notes, what is deemed legally unre-
alistic has always been a function of power and culture: women 
having the vote was considered unrealistic, same-sex marriage 
145 Matike Mai, He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 101.
145Lockie: Towards Decolonising Constitutionalism
was considered unrealistic.146 However, while law can and has 
often been used to preserve the status quo, and is of course sup-
ported by enormous state power, as a human construct it is ulti-
mately a creative institution. Even within the colonial common-
law system, legal creativity has classically been used in equity 
and trusts, in corporate law with limited liability and corporate 
legal personhood, and, more recently and specifically to Aotearoa 
New Zealand, in the legislation affording legal personhood to Te 
Urewera and Waikato Te Awa. Legal creativity is how the Treaty 
received greater constitutional significance in the first place. The 
suggestion that a Tiriti-based constitution of substantive power-
sharing, of some form of dual sovereignty, is unrealistic, before 
attempts are made to take seriously and think through this pro-
posal, is an evasion in the context of an always adapting and 
contingent institution.
To critique current orthodoxy through a postcoloni-
al praxis is not to ‘[throw] the legal baby out with the Treaty 
bathwater’,147 but rather a belief in the creative potential of law 
and an earnest endeavour to think about how we can practice 
democracy differently. Given the omnipresence of colonial ide-
ology, the pervasiveness of the distribution of the sensible, this 
endeavour will not be easy, and it will take time. But the starting 
point must be unsettling the orthodoxy’s claims to neutrality and 
universality. This will open the way for more honest dialogue 
and planning about what values we want reflected in our consti-
tutional arrangements—on Tiriti, not colonial, terms, and recog-
nising the depth of philosophical difference, but also the common 
ground, between the Tiriti partners. 
146 Salient, ‘Interview with Moana Jackson,’ May 19, 2017. http://salient.org.
nz/2017/05/interview-moana-jackson/.
147 K Upston-Hooper, ‘Slaying the Leviathan: Critical Jurisprudence and the Treaty 
of Waitangi’, VUWLR 28 (1998): 696.
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